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Notes
The Proposed Change in the
Minnesota State Inheritance Taxation
of Jointly Owned Property
Minnesota imposes an inheritance tax on the right of a
survivor to the possession and enjoyment of jointly
owned property upon the death of a co-owner. The tax
is based on the full value of the property less that por-
tion which is shown to have originally belonged to the
survivor. The application of this rule often imposes a
difficult evidentiary burden on survivors to establish
their original interests in jointly held property, and a cor-
relative administrative burden on the state commis-
sioner of taxation. The author of this Note discusses
these difficulties and the advisability of proposed reme-
dial legislation. He concludes by advocating the adoption
of legislation providing for taxation only of the dece-
dent's fractional interest in jointly owned property.
INTRODUCTION
Most jurisdictions impose a tax upon the "interest" of a dece-
dent in property held in joint tenancy at the date of his death.
This is done either by taxing the decedent's interest - an estate
tax - or by taxing the transfer of the decedent's interest to the
surviving joint tenant - an inheritance or succession tax In
1. The federal government, the District of Columbia, and 42 states explic-
itly impose such a tax by statute. Vermont has imposed one by judicial con-
struction. Alaska, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, Texas, and Wyom-
ing either do not recognize joint estates or do not impose an estate or inherit-
ance tax upon a decedent's interest in them. See 4 and 5 P-H In. & TRAs.
TAx SERv. (the unit for every state) 112, 113 (1965).
2. It is unlikely that the decedent's interest in joint tenancies or tenancies
by the entirety would be taxable at death under an estate or succession tax
statute which did not provide expressly therefor. But see note I supra (Ver-
mont). This arises from the fact that the survivor's acquisition of the entire
interest is technically founded not upon the death of the decedent, but upon
the instrument which created the joint interest. Tyler v. United States, 281
U.S. 497, 502 (1930) (dictum). However, the Tyler case held the direct tax and
due process clauses did not preclude the inclusion of jointly held property in
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determining the extent of the decedent's interest in the property,
two methods are most commonly used. The federal government3
and a substantial number of states, including Minnesota,' have
adopted the "contribution" method. Broadly speaking, it pro-
the decedent's estate for federal estate tax purposes to the extent that contri-
bution by the survivor was not shown, since "the death of one of the parties to
the tenancy became the 'generating source' of important and definite acces-
sions to the property rights of the other." Id. at 504. Blackstone himself recog-
nized the significance of the death of one joint tenant upon the rights of the
survivor(s): "This right of survivorship is called by our ancient authors the
jus acefescendi, because the right upon death of one joint-tenant, accumulates
and increases to the survivors . . . ." 2 BLACKSTONE COADEMNTAuES *184.
(Emphasis added.)
Not all states recognize joint tenancies in personal property and even those
which do would not usually recognize a joint tenancy in a joint bank account
without specific statutory provision therefor. See Kepner, Five More Years of
the Joint Bank Account Muddle, 26 U. Cm. L. REv. 376 (1959); Kepner, The
Joint and Survivorship Bank Account-A Concept Without a Name, 41
CAUiF. L. REv. 596, 598-603 & n.10 (1953).
3. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2040.
4. Mnr. STAT. § 291.01 (1961) provides in part as follows:
Subd. 4. Jointly owned property. (1) Whenever any property, real or
personal, is held in the joint names of two or more persons, or is de-
posited in banks or in other institutions or depositaries in the joint
names of two or more persons payable to either or the survivor, upon
the death of one of such persons the right of the survivor or survivors,
to the immediate ownership or possession and enjoyment of such prop-
erty, shall be deeied a transfer and subject to the inheritance tax im-
posed by this chapter, except such part thereof as may be shown to
have originally belonged to the survivor or survivors and never to have
been received or acquired by them from the decedent for less than an
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth; in which
case there shall be excepted only such part as is proportionate to the
consideration furnished by the survivor or survivors. Provided, where
any property has been acquired prior to April 29, 1935, by the de-
cendent and spouse, as joint tenants, not in excess of one-half of the
value thereof shall be taxable. Provided, further, where property has
been acquired at any time by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance, by
the decedent and any other person or persons, as joint tenants, the
taxable portion shall be the value of a fractional part of said property
to be determined by dividing the value of the property by the number
of joint tenants.
Eighteen other states have adopted a "contribution" system which is ap-
plied to all joint tenancies. Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, New York, and South
Carolina closely follow the federal rule. Arizona, California, Delaware, Idaho,
Iowa, Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Rhode Island,
Tennessee and Washington adhere to the federal rule with some modifications.
See 4 and 5 P-H In. & TRANs. TAx SERv. (the units for the above states)
112, 113 (1965).
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vides for taxation of that portion of the property which the sur-
vivor is unable to demonstrate that he contributed. Nine states'
and the District of Columbia6 utilize the "fractional" approach,
under which only the decedent's fractional interest in the jointly
held property is taxed, regardless of the relative contributions of
the owners. The remaining states which tax joint ownership inter-
ests employ various hybrids of these two methods.'
During the 1963 session of the Minnesota Legislature, bills
were introduced in both the house of representatives and the
senate which, if enacted, would have altered the existing Minne-
sota rule in this area. The house proposal provided for the taxa-
tion of all joint interests under the fractional rule." The senate
bill provided for the substitution of the fractional method only
5. Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Montana,
Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. See 4 and 5 P-H INH. & TRANs. TAx SERV. (the
units for the above states) 1 112, 113 (1965).
6. D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1602 (1961).
7. Some states which generally follow the contribution system apply some
variant of the fractional method to interests passing from spouse to spouse.
They include Hawaii, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont,
and Virginia. 4 and 5 P-H IN. & TRANs. TAx SERV. (the units for the above
states) 112, 113 (1965). The Minnesota statute provides that no more
than one-half the value of property acquired by the decedent and his spouse
in joint tenancy prior to April 29, 1935 shall be taxable. See MaNr. STAT. §
291.01 subd. 4 (1961), quoted in note 4 supra.
8. "H.F. No. 588, A bill for an act relating to inheritance and transfer
taxes and the assessment thereof; amending Minnesota Statutes 1961, Section
291.01, Subdivision 4." (All large capitals in original.) The bill was read for
the first time on February 13, 1963, and referred to the committee on taxes.
I JOURNAL OF THE HoUSE 297 (1963). The bill proposed to amend § 291.01
subd. 4 to read in part as follows (proposed changes in italics):
(1) Whenever any property, real or personal, is held in the joint names
of two or more persons, or is deposited in banks or in other institutions
or depositaries in the joint names of two or more persons payable to
either or the survivor, upon the death of one of such persons the right
of the survivor or survivors, to the immediate ownership or possession
and enjoyment of such property, shall be deemed a transfer taxable un-
der the provisions of this act in the same manner as though a fractional
part of the property to be determined by dividing the value of the en-
tire property by the number of joint tenants, joint depositors or
persons, belonged absolutely to the deceased joint tenant, joint de-
positor or person and had been devised or bequeathed to the surviv-
ing joint tenant or joint tenants, person or persons, by such deceased
joint tenant or joint despositor by will.
The termination of a joint tenancy, when the transfer of the prop-
erty is to the person to whom it originally belonged, shall not be
deemed a transfer subject to the gift tax provisions of chapter 292, or
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with respect to interests passing to a surviving spouse.' Neither
bill was ever reported out of committee and these or similar pro-
posals have not been reintroduced during the 1965 legislative ses-
sion. The function of this Note is to examine the desirability and
implications of such a change in Minnesota law.
I. PRESENT MINNESOTA LAW
Minnesota Statutes, section 291.01 subd. 4,1o expressly applies
the "contribution" test to all joint interests in property, including
bank accounts, real estate, and personalty, acquired on or after
the provisions of section 291.01, subdivision 1(3) provided that such
transfer is made 'within a period of two years beginning on the effective
date of this act.
9. "S.F. No. 683: A bill for an act relating to inheritance and transfer
taxes and the assessment thereof; amending Minnesota Statutes 1961, Sec-
tion 291.01, Subdivision 4." (,All large capitals in original.) The bill was given
its first reading on February 19, 1963, and referred to the committee on the
judiciary. JOURNAL OF THE SENATE 363 (1963). The bill proposed to amend
§ 291.01 subd. 4 to read in part as follows:
(1) (a) Except as to transfers between husband and wife, which are
taxable under subsection (b) of this section in the manner therein pro-
vided, . . . [jointly held property shall be taxed as in the existing
provision].
(b) Whenever property described in subsection (a) hereof is held
in the joint names of husband and wife, or in the joint names of hus-
band and wife and one or more other persons, upon the death of either
the husband or wife the surviving spouse shall be deemed to have re-
ceived a transfer taxable under this section to the extent of the increase
in the value of the surviving spouse's interest in such property resulting
from the death of the deceased spouse. Such surviving spouse's interest
in such property shall be valued for purposes of this section, first, by
dividing the value of the entire property at the death of the deceased
spouse by the number of joint owners including such deceased spouse,
and second, by dividing the value of the entire property at the death
of the deceased spouse by the number of joint owners excluding such
deceased spouse, and, third, by subtracting the first quotient from the
second quotient. The remainder resulting from such subtraction shall be
deemed a transfer from such deceased spouse to such surviving spouse,
taxable in the same manner as though property equal in value to such
remainder had belonged absolutely to such deceased spouse and had
been devised or bequeathed to such surviving spouse by such deceased
spouse by will.
The termination of a joint tenancy, when the transfer of the prop-
erty is to the spouse to whom it originally belonged, shall not be deemed
a transfer subject to the gift tax provisions of Chapter 292, or the pro-
visions of section 291.01, subdivision 1 (3), provided that such trans-
fer is made within a period of two years beginning on the effective date
of this article.
10. Quoted in part in note 4 supra.
April 9, 1935.1 Joint tenancies between spouses created prior to
that date are taxed on a fractional basis unless the survivor proves
that he contributed over one-half the property, in which case the
tax is imposed only on the value allocable to the remaining por-
tion.12 Where a joint tenancy is created by gift from a third party,
only the decedent's fractional interest is subject to taxation.
The major difficulty with the contribution method lies in the
uncertainty which exists as to the magnitude of the burden im-
posed upon the survivor to prove the size of his contribution. The
Minnesota Inheritance Tax Regulations provide that the burden
of proof rests upon the survivor, who must support his claim by
an affidavit stating his proportionate contribution. Furthermore,
he may be required by the commissioner to produce additional
supporting records such as tax returns, receipts, cancelled checks,
and bank books." The only two reported decisions relating to the
sufficiency of the survivor's evidence, Estate of Benham"' and
Kochendorfer v. Commissioner,' reveal that the determination
in any given case whether the survivor has contributed and, if so,
the extent of his contribution, will be controlled largely by the
burden of documentary production that the commissioner chooses
to impose and the fortuity that the survivor is or is not able to
satisfy it.
In Estate of Benham, H and W opened a joint bank account
when they were married, H contributing $50 and W an "unascer-
11. The statute applies to all property held jointly with right of survivor-
ship. The "four unities" required for the creation of a common law joint
tenancy need not be present. Since Minnesota does not recognize tenancies
by the entirety, see Wilson v. Wilson, 43 Minn. 898, 45 N.W. 710 (1890),
these interests are, of course, not covered by § 291.01 subd. 4. Nor does the
statute apply to tenancies in common, since no right of survivorship is incident
to that estate. Minnesota Inh. Tax Reg. 59(b), 4 P-H INH. & TRANs. TAX
SERv. Minn. I 112-A (1964).
12. This application of the fractional test relates only to "joint tenancies"
and not to other property merely "held jointly," such as joint bank accounts.
See Minnesota Inh. Tax Reg. 58(a), 4 P-H INK. & TRAS. TAx SERV. Minn.
112-A (1964).
13. The commissioner was authorized to issue regulations by the 1963
session of the legislature. Mhzx. STAT. ANN. § 291.81 (Supp. 1964); see Minne-
sota Inh. Tax Regs. 58-60, 4 P-H INN. & TRANS. TAx SERV. Minn. I 112-A
(1964). See also MINNESOTA CoMassIoNER OF TAXATION, A REPRINT OF IN-
HERITANcE TAx SUGGESTIONS AND G:re TAx COMPENDimU 13 (1956).
14. Minnesota Inh. Tax Reg. 59(c), 4 P-H LIn. & TRANs. TAx SERv. Minn.
112-A (1964). This regulation apparently codified the existing administra-
tive practice which was based on the rather obvious intent of § 291.01 subd. 4.
15. No. 780, Minn. Bd. of Tax Appeals, March 21, 1960.
16. No. 1054, Minn. Bd. of Tax Appeals, Sept. 9, 1964.
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tained substantial amount." W then financed the last two years
of H's medical training. During their marriage she inherited
$16,000, and H received a $2,000 gift. For 60 years prior to H's
death, H and W had been jointly engaged in the real estate busi-
ness, W originally having furnished the cash which enabled them
to establish the business. They had assumed joint liability on all
notes and mortgages. All property acquired during the marriage
was held in joint tenancy. At H's death the commissioner found
that W had not sufficiently proved that she had contributed to
the acquisition of the jointly held property and consequently as-
sessed an inheritance tax based upon the full value of that prop-
erty. The Board of Tax Appeals reversed the commissioner's order
and sustained W's claim of 50 percent contribution, relying solely
on the evidence outlined above.
While W proved that she had made some contribution, she
clearly did not establish its specific amount. The board failed to
articulate its reasons for nevertheless finding contribution and
valuing it at 50 percent. However it would seem to have held im-
plicitly that strong probative evidence of the survivor's contribu-
tion is not required.
This inference was recently vitiated in Kochendorfer. In that
case the decedent in 1946 induced the taxpayer to leave her em-
ployment and work for him by promising that she would be
"much farther ahead" by doing so than if she continued her prior
employment. During the next 13 years she worked for the dece-
dent and lived in his household without being paid a salary. In
1951 decedent established a savings account in taxpayer's name
and made an initial deposit of $5,000. Subsequent deposits in-
creased the balance to over $10,000 by July, 1960, one month
prior to the decedent's death. At that time, the decedent with-
drew over $9,000 and placed it in a joint bank account in the
names of the taxpayer and himself. On his death decedent held
property worth over $42,000 in joint tenancy with taxpayer.
The taxpayer asserted principally that the joint tenancy prop-
erty devolving upon her represented compensation for her serv-
ices to the decedent, and that she therefore had contributed the
consideration for all the property and owed no inheritance tax.
Alternatively she argued that since she would have earned $23,000
during the period she worked for the decedent, had she continued
in her former employment at her former rate of pay, she had con-
tributed at least that amount to the value of the joint tenancy
property. The commissioner found no contribution and assessed
an inheritance tax on the entire $42,000. On appeal the Board of
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Tax Appeals affirmed, except as to the $9,000 of joint tenancy
property derived from the bank account opened in taxpayer's
name in 1951.
In reaching its decision the board relied heavily on the taxpay-
er's failure to file income tax returns while working for the dece-
dent. Furthermore, the taxpayer's claim of contribution was sup-
ported only by her "mere" and "bare" assertions that she had in
fact earned the property as compensation for her services. Finally,
had taxpayer successfully asserted a claim for compensation for
her services in probate court, "her claim of contribution might
have some merit."'1 '
The board's reasoning is at best unpersuasive and inconsistent,
reflecting very well the difficulties confronted in adjudicating con-
tribution issues on the basis of a typically inadequate record. The
inferences which the board draws from the taxpayer's failure to
file tax returns for the years 1946 through 1959 seems unfounded.
On the one hand, the board relied on this omission as a basis
for denying the larger portion of the taxpayer's claim of contribu-
tion, presumably on the ground that it represented an admission
by her that her services were not in fact rendered for compensa-
tion. Yet apart from the sums deposited in taxpayer's savings
account - from which $9,000 of the joint tenancy property was
"contributed" - she received no taxable compensation until the
transfers to her as joint tenant. It is not clear when these trans-
fers were made, though it may be inferred from the board's opin-
ion that it was not until shortly before the decedent died in 1960.
If so, it seems most likely - in view of the commissioner's finding
that the parties had entered into an employment relationship -
that the absence of tax returns for the years 1946 through 1959
indicate not that the taxpayer's services were rendered gratuitous-
ly, but that her compensation was deferred until decedent created
the joint interests.s On the other hand, the board obviously failed
to give any consideration at all to the absence of tax returns in
17. Ibid. The validity of this suggestion seems doubtful. Assuming that
the transfers into joint tenancy were intended by the parties to constitute
full compensation for her services, taxpayer possessed no claim against the
estate. Thus the Board seems to be suggesting that one who alleges for in-
heritance tax purposes that a joint property interest was created to satisfy
a debt owed him must present a spurious claim against his former debtor's
estate in order to establish that fact.
18. No findings were made whether taxpayer filed a tax return for 1960
reporting the acquisition of some or all of the joint interests in question. Had
she done so, the conclusion would have been inescapable that she had been
working pursuant to a deferred income agreement and not gratuitously, there-
by "contributing" to the acquisition of the joint interests.
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finding the $9,000 contribution. But such a finding necessarily
implies that decedent's deposits in taxpayer's savings account
during the 1950's constituted compensation for services rendered
pursuant to their employment agreement, since this amount
would not have been treated as a contribution if it were a gift. 9
Thus, to be consistent with its treatment of the remainder of the
joint tenancy property, the board ought to have inferred from
the failure to file tax returns that the deposits were not compen-
sation for services rendered and hence were not "contributed" by
the taxpayer.
Although the board based its decision in Kochendorfer gener-
ally on the taxpayer's failure to produce sufficient evidence to
sustain her burden of showing contribution, it is hard to see what
further evidence taxpayer could have adduced. Assuming that the
case involved a classic oral contract to exchange nursing care and
housekeeping services for the promise of an inheritance, it would
indeed be extraordinary if the surviving promisee were able to
offer more persuasive proof of the arrangement than did taxpayer
in this caseYo Because the contribution method imposes on the
survivor the burden of proving a specific contribution, while si-
multaneously requiring the commissioner to perform the onerous
duty of distinguishing false from valid claims, cases such as
Kochendorfer inevitably arise.
19. "The survivor must trace the cost of the jointly owned property to
consideration furnished by him" to establish a valid claim of contribution. A
gift from the decedent to the survivor does not qualify as a contribution to
the cost of a subsequently purchased joint property interest. Minnesota Inh.
Tax Reg. 59(d), Example 1, 4 P-H INH. & TRANs. TAx SERV. Minn. 112-A
(1964).
20. Minnesota Inh. Tax Reg. 59(e), Example 2, 4 P-H INH. & TRANs. TAX
SERv. Minn. I 112-A (1964), provides that where H and W contribute equal
amounts of capital to the establishment of a business and agree to share its
profits equally and to cooperate in its management, it will not be inferred that
W rendered her services gratuitously, and on H's death W may claim a con-
tribution of one-half the value of their joint holdings. The regulation requires,
however, that "the existence of such an agreement .. . be clearly established."
Had the board chosen to do so, it could reasonably have analogized the facts
of the Kochendorfer case to this example and concluded that since some agree-
ment between decedent and taxpayer was shown to have existed, any inference
that taxpayer left her former employment to work for decedent gratuitously
was unwarranted. Valuing her services or determining the agreed upon com-
pensation would have been the only remaining problem which, consistent with
Minnesota Inh. Tax Reg. 59(c), 4 P-H INn. & TRANs. TAx SERv. Minn.
112-A (1964), should have been remanded to the commissioner for his deter-
mination from the information available. Regulation 59(c) is quoted in note
14 supra.
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H. CONTRIBUTION v. THE FRACTIONAL METHOD
The contribution method is subject to strong attack on two
related grounds. First, it may frequently be unrealistic and un-
reasonable to require, as was done in Kochendorfer, that the sur-
vivor sustain a substantial burden of proof that he made a spe-
cific contribution to the acquisition of jointly owned property,
since business records adequate to do so may either never be
made or be unavailable at the joint tenant's death 2' Where two
or more tenants of a joint bank account have made deposits and
withdrawals, it would ordinarily be impossible to satisfy this bur-
den. As a result, while the honest taxpayer may well be unable
to present sufficient evidence to establish a valid claim, the dis-
honest taxpayer may be encouraged to contrive fraudulent rec-
ords to support a fabricated claim. On the other hand, if the sur-
vivor is permitted to satisfy the burden with relatively meager
evidence, as in the Benham case, there is an even greater danger
of taxpayer fraud. Second, whether the burden of proof be sub-
stantial or slight, the contribution approach imposes on the com-
missioner the expensive and difficult administrative task of ad-
judicating the validity and amount of contribution claims on a
case by case basis?"
21. Interview With Louis Plutzer, Head of the Inheritance and Gift Tax
Division, Minnesota Department of Taxation, in St. Paul, March, 1965. While
the scope of this Note is confined to an examination of Minnesota's experience,
the unrealistic and often unreasonable burden of proving a specific contribution
has apparently caused similar difficulty at the federal level. See, e.g., cases
cited in P-H FED. TAx SERv. (Estate & Gift Taxes) 190403-03.1 (1963).
22. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 412 (8d ed. 1961); cases cited in P-H FED.
TAx SERv. (Estate & Gift Taxes) 120403.2(35) (1963).
23. Because its resources are limited, the Minnesota Inheritance and Gift
Tax Division has been content to accept the valuation of the survivor's con-
tribution used for federal estate tax purposes. This approach is not entirely
satisfactory in those cases where the federal interest, in contrast to that of
the state, is insufficient to justify substantial investigation. Because of the
marital deduction under the federal estate tax, federal administrators must
find two dollars in exaggerated contribution claims to produce an additional
dollar of taxable estate in those cases where the surviving owner is the
<ecedent's spouse. Moreover, federal administrators may accept contribution
claims where they have no effect upon the amount of estate tax due. For
instance, if H dies leaving a $100,000 estate, with W surviving, the $60,000
exclusion coupled with the marital deduction would eliminate any taxable
estate with the result that the validity of a contribution claim would hold no
federal tax significance. Although the Minnesota Inheritance and Gift Tax
Division is aware of these deficiencies in the present procedure, there is no
feasible alternative. Interview With Louis Plutzer, Head of the Inheritance
and Gift Tax Division, Minnesota Department of Taxation, in St. Paul,
March, 1965.
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The fractional method eliminates these difficulties. By correlat-
ing inheritance taxation with the common law concept of joint
ownership, administrative inquiry is limited to determining
whether property is jointly owned. Claims and proof of contribu-
tion become irrelevant. Further, as applied to interspousal joint
interests, the fractional method has the virtue of recognizing the
equal interests of husband and wife as parts of a single economic
unit?' This is accomplished by permitting the spouses to arrange
for the allocation of half of their property to the survivor for pur-
poses of computing inheritance taxes." This concept underlies
other areas of tax law. In community property states,.2 one half
of the property acquired during marriage is deemed to belong to
each spouse, regardless of which one acquired it or supplied the
funds with which it was purchased? 7 The federal and state joint
income tax return"8 and the marital deduction under the federal
estate"9 and gift taxes,30 expressly designed to equalize treatment
of taxpayers in common law and community property jurisdic-
24. SmTAMAKI, THE AMuERIcAN FAmLY I THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 101-
02 n.38 (1953).
25. The Minnesota inheritance tax already provides for the exemption of
certain amounts of property passing between close relatives. For example,
exemption is provided for a homestead passing to the decedent's spouse to the
extent of $30,000 of its appraised value, MiNN. STAT. § 291.05(2) (1961), for
up to $80,000 of property passing to the decedent's widow, MINN. STAT. §
291.05(3) (1961), and for up to $6,000 of property passing to the decedent's
widower, MmN. STAT. 291.05(5) (1961). Thus the adoption of the fractional
method would affect the taxation of interspousal joint interests only after
these exemptions had been exhausted.
26. Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas,
and Washington. 4 and 5 P-H INH. & TRANs. TAx SERv. (the units for the
above states) 114 (1965).
27. See 2 Ammuc A LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 7.1, .19, .20 (Casner ed. 1952);
1 DE FUNIAK, PRINcIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY §§ 1, 102, 113 (1943).
Furthermore, California and Idaho now exempt by statute all community
property transferred on death to a surviving spouse. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE
§§ 18551, 18558; IDAHo CODE Am. § 14-408(2.a) (Supp. 1963). In New
Mexico, all community property received by a husband on the death of his
wife is exempt. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-1-8 (1953); In re Chavez's Estate,
34 N.M. 258, 280 Pac. 241 (1929).
28. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6018; MINN. STAT. § 290.38 (1961); see
2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 7.4, at 125 (Casner ed. 1952).
29. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, 2056.
30. TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2528. See also Young, Tax Incidents of
Joint Ownership, 1959 U. Iu. L.F. 972, 986. Minnesota also provides for
marital exemptions and credits under its gift tax. See MaN. STAT. H§ 292.05(1),
.07(3) (1961).
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tions,31 may also be regarded as acknowledging this concept.3 2
If one does not regard the fractional method as justified by an
equality of interest in each other's property on the part of hus-
band and wife, support for it may be found in the substantiality
of the interest received by the donee of a joint ownership interest.
Included within these interests are the rights of survivorship,"
partition," and alienation .3 The substantiality of the interest is
recognized by the imposition of both the Minnesota and federalP
gift taxes upon the transfer of property into joint tenancy."
31. S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), in 1948-1 Cum. BuLL.
285, 303.
32. See Cruikshank, California's Marital Exemption and Its Effect on the
Inheritance Tax Law, 29 TAXEs 226 (1951); Surrey, Federal Taxation of the
Family - The Revenue Act of 1948, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1097, 1162 (1948).
33. 2 AmE=RCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.1, at 3 (Casner ed. 1952); 2
TWFrANY, REAL PROPERTY § 419 (3d ed. 1939). The survivor's absolute owner-
ship of the property upon his joint tenant's death is not subject to claims by
creditors of the latter. Irvine v. Helvering, 99 F.2d 265, 269 (8th Cir. 1988).
But see Park Enterprises v. Trach, 233 Minn. 467, 47 N.W.2d 194 (1951)
(creditor of one tenant permitted to levy on entire joint bank account). For
an analysis of the joint tenant-creditor relationship, see Mamer, Legal Con-
sequences of Joint Ownership, 1959 U. Im. L.F. 944, 958-64. For an example
of valuation of an interest in a tenancy by the entirety, see Oregon Gift Tax
Reg., art. 5(g), 5 P-H INH. & TRANs. TAx SERv. Ore. 4105 (1964).
34. See 2 TiFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 475 (3d ed. 1939).
35. Alienation destroys the joint tenancy and results in the creation of a
tenancy in common between the purchaser and the remaining tenant. See
Partridge v. Berlinger, 325 Ill. 253, 156 N.E. 352 (1927); Smith v. Smith, 290
Mich. 143, 287 N.W. 411 (1939). See also 2 TiFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 425
(3d ed. 1939).
36. MuNm. STAT. § 292.01 (1961).
37. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(5) (1958). The value of the right of sur-
vivorship will depend upon the relative life expectancies of the cotenants.
However, this factor is not considered in valuing the gift made by the domi-
nant or sole contributor to the other tenant. Rather, the arbitrary measure
of one-half the property value at the time of the gift is utilized. See ibid.
But cf. Bouchard v. Commissioner, 285 F.2d 556 (1st Cir. 1961) (donative
intent absent). The reason for disregarding the relative life expectancies of
the tenants is the power of either to extinguish the right of survivorship by
severing the joint tenancy.
38. However, both the Minnesota and federal gift tax statutes permit post-
ponement of tax, unless an election to be taxed is made, where a husband
and wife take title to real estate in joint tenancy and one was the major
contributor. See MNN. SPAT. § 292.01 subd. 7 (1961); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 2515. The enactment of § 2515 arose from a belief that spouses trans-
ferring real estate into joint tenancy have no intention to make a gift and lack
knowledge that they have done so. See ABA Subcomm. of Comm. on Trusts
and Estates, Joint Tenancy and the Federal Tax Law, 101 TRUSTS & ESTATES
1038, 1039-40 (1962).
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Any proposed change in the inheritance tax should be consid-
ered in light of its likely effect upon revenue. The contribution
method would usually produce more revenue than would the frac-
tional in those instances where the decedent contributed over 50
percent of the cost of the property." As a practical matter, how-
ever, the revenue loss accompanying adoption of the fractional
scheme is unlikely to be significant, since few large estates are
held in joint tenancy.40 Although the proposed change would
create opportunities for tax avoidance,41 it is doubtful that they
would be sufficiently attractive in enough cases to cause an ap-
preciable shift to the joint tenancy form of ownership."
The advantages and disadvantages of joint ownership as a tax
avoidance device may be clarified by an example. Suppose H
gives a joint savings account or United States bonds or real estate
to himself and W as joint tenants. No federal or state gift tax
The establishment of a joint bank account or purchase of a United States
government bond in joint names are also transfers into joint ownership which
do not give rise to gift tax liability. Such transfers are not considered com-
pleted gifts since the donor, acting alone, may extinguish the donee's interest
by withdrawing all funds from the bank account or cashing in the bonds.
Thus no "gift" has been made until the donee actually receives the pro-
ceeds of the account or bond. See Treas. Reg. § 25.9511--1(h)(4) (1958). But
see Estate of Schley, 271 Wis. 74, 72 N.W.2d 767 (1955). See also Department
of Taxation v. Berry, 258 Wis. 544, 46 N.W.2d 757 (1951). See generally
1961 Wis. L. REv. 150, 152.
39. However, the impact of this difference is mitigated somewhat by the
provision that property subjected to an inheritance tax is exempt from sub-
sequent inheritance taxation during the next five years. See MmN. STAT.
§ 291.06 (1961); cf. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2013.
40. Interview With Mr. Louis Plutzer, Head of the Inheritance and Gift
Tax Division, Minnesota Department of Taxation, in St. Paul, March, 1965.
41. However, adoption of the fractional method would not facilitate
avoidance of inheritance taxation by transfers in contemplation of death.
Those states which have adopted fractional treatment of spouses' joint
interests usually scrutinize transfers into joint tenancy to preclude avoidance
of inheritance taxation by such predeath transfers. See note 56 infra and
accompanying text.
42. Insofar as the planning of large estates is dominated by federal tax
considerations, the application of the contribution method on the federal
level would probably discourage appreciable transfers into joint tenancy to
gain state fractional treatment.
43. At common law, a joint tenancy could not be created by a conveyance
from A to A and B, because the unities of time and title would not be present.
However, a conveyance by A to X and a reconveyance by X to A and B as
joint tenants was normally effectual. At present, this circuitous procedure is
outmoded in many states by statutes permitting A to create a joint tenancy
between himself and B by a direct conveyance. See generally 2 AMERICAN
LAw oF PRoPERTY § 6.2, at 9 (Casner ed. 1952).
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is payable on the initial transfer." If H predeceased W, the entire
value of the property would be subject to inheritance taxation
under the contribution approach, but tax would be imposed on
only half the value of the property under the fractional method.45
The advantage under the fractional method, however, depends
on the donor predeceasing the donee. If the order of deaths were
reversed, H would be taxed on one half the value of the property
at W's death, simply to return to his original status. The uncer-
tainty usually involved in predicting the order of deaths may out-
weigh the value of the saving to be realized if one guesses correct-
ly. To the extent, however, that some degree of certainty can be
interjected by the use of mortality tables or the presence of fail-
ing health or a substantial age spread between the tenants, the
fractional method may make joint tenancies attractive for tax
purposes.4 0
It has been argued that the contribution method ought to be
retained, since it follows federal law out of which a large volume
of interpretive rulings and decision have developed. Also, estates
paying the federal estate tax would not have to make two compu-
tations. However, the relative simplicity of the fractional rule
would seem to minimize these advantages.
III. THE MINNESOTA PROPOSALS
The 1963 house proposal would have applied the fractional
method to all joint interests,"4 while the senate bill would have
changed only the treatment of spouses' joint holdings, retaining the
present method for taxing all other joint interests." To the extent
44. See note 38 siupra.
45. This conclusion assumes that the gift was not made in contemplation
of death. See text accompanying note 56 infra. The fact that in this situation
half -the property passes to the surviving spouse tax-free, was pointed out in
1961 Wxs. L. REV. 150, 153, as a reason for Wisconsin to switch from the
fractional to the contribution system. Prior to 1961, Wisconsin had twice con-
sidered making such a change, first in 1951, see Ludwig, Joint Tenancy and
Taxes, 25 Wis. B. Bull., Oct. 1952, pp. 9, 14, and most recently in 1959, 1961
Wis. L. RtEV. 150, 153 n.18.
46. It is doubtful that this possibility would lead to a significant increase
in the number of adult-minor joint tenancies. Minors' trusts and custodian-
ship arrangements are effective and more attractive means of completing tax
free transfers to minors to the extent of the annual and aggregate gift tax
exemptions. See CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 243-60 (3d ed. 1961).
47. See Ludwig, supra note 45; 10 MoNr. L. REV. 100, 109 (1949); 1961
Wis. L. REV. 150, 153. See also Cruikshank, supra note 32, at 226-27.
48. See note 8 supra.
49. See note 9 supra.
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that innovation is justified by a desire to ease the administrative
burden placed on the commissioner by the present system, the
house proposal seems preferable. On the other hand, if change is
advocated to protect the surviving joint owner who has failed to
make and preserve the business records necessary to prove con-
tribution under present law, it may be reasonable to distinguish
between spouses and other joint owners on the theory that the
latter are more likely to keep records than are the former. How-
ever, to the extent that other intrafamilial joint owners are as un-
likely as spouses to keep records, it may be that the senate bill
should be broadened to accord fractional treatment to relatives
generally, rather than merely spouses.50
A change of law which applied the fractional method to joint
tenancies created prior to its enactment might work an unjust
hardship on those persons who had relied on the existing rule."
This would happen where a cotenant making little or no contri-
bution predeceased the substantial contributor. The senate and
house bills sought to provide a remedy for this situation by ex-
empting from state gift taxation the termination of joint tenan-
cies by transfer of the property, back to the tenant to whom it
originally belonged, within two years of the enactment of the
amendment.52 However, the terminating transfers would remain
subject to the federal gift tax. Consequently, an amendment to
the bill was suggested which would have permitted the spouses
to elect within two years after passage of the amendment to be
taxed under the contribution method." By making this election
H could assure that his original expectations would be fulfilled.
50. At least one state which generally follows the contribution method but
applies the fractional rule to interspousal joint ownership also accords frac-
tional treatment to property transferred by right of survivorship from the
decedent to his children. See UTAH CODE ANw. § 59-12-5 (1953). However, no
more than $40,000 worth of property may pass tax free in this manner.
A further problem presented by the fractional method which may be over-
looked by the proposals is the treatment of joint bank accounts. Some states
otherwise following the fractional method have excluded them from its cover-
age. See COLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 138-3-8 (1963); MN. REv. STAT. ANN. ch.
155, §§ 2, 10-A (1964).
51. However, it seems unlikely that such retroactivity would be subject
to successful attack on constitutional grounds. See Gwinn v. Commissioner,
287 U.S. 224 (1932).
52. See the last paragraphs of the extracts from the house and senate bills
supra notes 8 and 9.
53. The amendment, which was suggested by Mr. Louis Plutzer of the
Minnesota Department of Taxation, would have added the following provision
to the proposed new § 291.01 subd. 4(1)(b) (quoted in note 9 supra):
Provided, however, That in the case of any joint tenancy created be-
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IV. JOINT TENANCY AND CONTEMPLATION
OF DEATH
Estate and inheritance tax statutes commonly provide for their
applicability to gifts made by the decedent in "contemplation of
death."" However, under the contribution system there is no
necessity to consider the applicability of such provisions to a
decedent's predeath transfers to himself and another in joint ten-
ancy, since the full value of the transferred property would be
subject to tax even in the absence of a contemplation of death
provision."5 This question does arise in jurisdictions using the
fractional method where the decedent's proportionate contribu-
tion exceeds his fractional interest. It has been held in such juris-
dictions that the amount by which the decedent's contribution
exceeded his fractional share constituted a taxable gift in con-
templation of death." This appears to be a sound result in view
of the general purpose of the contemplation of death provisions
to prevent evasion of death transfer taxes by inter vivos gifts
immediately prior to death.
Neither of the fractional interest bills proposed in the Minne-
sota 1963 legislative session expressly states that notwithstand-
ing their provisions, transfers in joint tenancy in contemplation
tween husband and wife prior to the date of enactment of this subsec-
tion (b), the joint tenants may elect within two years after such date
to pay the tax imposed by subsection (a) of this section in lieu of that
imposed by subsection (b). The time and manner of such election shall
be prescribed by the commissioner of taxation by regulation.
54. See, e.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2035; MArN. STAT. § 291.01 subd.
1(3) (1961).
55. The applicability of contemplation of death provisions to joint tenan-
cies presents problems in a somewhat different context under the contribution
system. One question relates to the treatment to be given the estate of a sole
contributor who terminates a joint tenancy in contemplation of death. Argu-
ably the entire value of the property should be includible, since it would have
been had the tenancy not been terminated. However, it has been held that only
half the property is includible since termination of a joint tenancy is a "sale
for consideration" and may be severed at the option of either tenant. See
Sullivan's Estate v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1949); Estate of
Brockway, 18 T.C. 488 (1952), acq., 1955-2 Cust. BuLL. 4. But cf. United
States v. Allen, 293 F.2d 916 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U. S. 944 (1961).
See also Estate of Borner, 25 T.C. 584 (1955). See generally Note, 61 MIcH.
L. REV. 1335 (1963).
56. See, e.g., State Bd. of Equalization v. Cole, 122 Mont. 9, 195 P.2d
989 (1948); Estate of Simonson, 11 Wis. 2d 84, 104 N.W.2d 134 (1960), 1961
Wis. L. REV. 150. But see Osterloh's Estate v. Carpenter, 337 S.W.2d 942
(Mo. 1960), in which the contemplation of death statute was found inappli-
cable to joint tenancy property because such property is not expressly sub-
jected to inheritance taxation. See note 1 srupra.
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of death will be taxed as such. However, both bills expressly pro-
vide that termination of a joint tenancy within two years after
enactment of the amendment shall not be taxed as a gift in con-
templation of death.5 7 One may therefore infer that the authors
intended that in all other respects the new statute would not af-
fect the taxation of tenancies created in contemplation of death.
It might be desirable to make that intention explicit.
CONCLUSION
Since the contribution method often results in the imposition
of an unrealistic and unpredictable burden of proof on surviving
contributors and an excessive burden of investigation and litiga-
tion on administrators, substitution of the fractional approach
appears highly desirable. Instead of allowing the outcome of cases
to depend upon the burden of proof which the commissioner and
board choose to require and the fortuity that the survivor can or
cannot meet it, the result would depend entirely on whether or
not the property was in fact held jointly, and if so, by how many
tenants. Issues of contribution would be irrelevant. And, since
there appears to be no weighty reason for limiting fractional treat-
ment to spouses, unlimited application would seem preferable. Of
course, manipulation to achieve tax free transfers would be possi-
ble. However, the likelihood of its being substantial is sufficiently
slight to be outweighed by the apparent advantages of change.
57. See the last paragraphs of the extracts from the house and senate bills,
supra notes 8 and 9.
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